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hopes of increasing supplies and thereby reducing the need for regula-
tion of curtailment. 4 Even if deregulation of prices were to increase
supplies dramatically, however, shortages would most likely remain
sufficiently serious to require some form of regulation over curtail-
ment. 5 While it is difficult to predict with any accuracy the future
form that natural gas allocation will take, North Carolina v. FERC
demonstrates that future end-use curtailment plans will be subjected to
close judicial scrutiny designed to ensure that such plans produce true
end-use results.
CHRISTOPHER WHITMAN MOORE
Attorney-Client Privilege-Diersfled Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith: New Rules for Applying the Privilege When the
Client Is a Corporation
The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure confidential
communications between an attorney and his client.' The privilege ap-
plies in both individual and corporate client contexts; when the client is
a corporation, however, application of the privilege may prove more
complex than when the client is an individual. Two questions must be
answered in determining the applicability of the privilege in the corpo-
rate client context: first, what types of activity constitute legal services
by the attorney and, second, which employees of a corporation may be
deemed to so represent the corporation as to be the corporate client. 2
In Diversifted Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,3 the United States Court of
94. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, does not deregulate prices on all natural gas, but
"gradually ends controls on the price of newly discovered gas until the price ceiling is lifted in
1985." 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2615-16 (1978); see note 5 supra.
95. See M. WILLRICH, supra note 1, at 13-14.
I. A number of criteria must be satisfied in order for the attorney-client privilege to apply.
"(1) Were legal advice of any kind is sought (2)from aprofessional legal advisor in his capaciy es
such, (3) the communications relating to thatpurpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure ... (8) except the protection be
waived." 8 J. WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
3. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed both these issues4 and
adopted new tests for determining when an attorney is acting in his
professional capacity5 and for deciding which employees represent the
corporation.
In 1975, the Weatherhead Company, a customer of Diversified In-
dustries, Incorporated, brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern IDistrict of Missouri against Diversified, alleging con-
spiracy to bribe Weatherhead employees.' During the course of this
litigation Weatherhead sought to discover a memorandum and report
that had been prepared earlier for Diversified by the law firm of
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (the Law Firm) and the corporate minutes
that referred to those writings. The memorandum and report were the
result of an intracorporate investigation that the Law Firm had con-
ducted for Diversified.' Endeavoring to protect the writings from dis-
4. A third issue of less importance arose in DiversfedIndustries that concerned the possible
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Diversified had revealed documents to the SEC (pursuant
to subpoena during an official investigation); later it sought to protect the documents against dis-
covery by plaintiff in a private lawsuit. The question was raised whether Diversified had thereby
waived its attorney-client privilege with respect to those documents. The court concluded that it
had not: "As Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and nonpublic SEC investiga-
tion, we conclude that only a limited waiver of the privilege occurred." 572 F.2d at 611 (citations
omitted). Although the Divers#fedIndustries court devoted only three sentences to this issue, there
is considerable disagreement among jurisdictions concerning whether such disclosure constitutes a
waiver. Compare In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.RD. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(voluntary production of documents for the SEC constitutes waiver), with United States v. Good-
man, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961) ("It has been
uniformly held that a prior disclosure to investigating officials cannot constitute a waiver of the
privilege with respect to the same matter in a subsequent legal proceeding. A waiver of the privi-
lege must occur in the same proceeding. . . in which it is sought to be invoked."), and Bucks
County Bank & Trust Co. v. Storck, 297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Haw. 1969) (testimony given to support
motion to have seized property returned does not constitute general waiver), and IBM Corp. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 44. F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968) (partial disclosure of privileged material to
third party during business negotiations not waiver of privilege in subsequent patent infringement
action).
5. See 572 F.2d at 610.
6. See id at 609.
7. The conspiracy allegation charged Diversified employees with bribing Weatherhead em-
ployees to make purchases of inferior copper. Id at 600.
8. In 1974 and 1975 Diversified became involved in litigation relating to a proxy fight. Dur-
ing the course of this litigation evidence revealed that Diversified might have maintained a fund
with which to bribe purchasing agents of other companies, including Weatherhead. Following
this litigation, Diversified's Board of Directors felt that an investigation should be made of the
corporation's practices. The Law Firm was then hired to make an investigation, interview em-
ployees, draw conclusions about the propriety of employee conduct, and make recommendations
to the Board concerning a future course of action. The Board of Directors instructed all employ-
ees to cooperate fully with this investigation. The memorandum outlined the manner in which the
Law Firm planned to conduct the investigation. Id The report detailed the actual investigation,
made findings with respect to the question whether a slush fund had been used in violation of
Diversified's standard business practices and internal controls, and made recommendations. Id
at 601. Certain corporate minutes restated parts of the report.
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covery, Diversified asserted that the documents were not subject to
discovery because they were protected by the attorney-client privilege.9
The district court refused to deny discovery and Diversified petitioned
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.10
The petition was first considered by a three-judge panel. Judge
Henley, speaking for the majority, concluded that because the Law
Firm had merely acted as an investigator and had not provided Diver-
sified with legal services or advice when it prepared the memorandum
or the report, the attorney-client privilege did not apply to the docu-
ments.I' He therefore found it unnecessary to decide if the employees
interviewed by the Law Firm represented the corporate client. Judge
Heaney dissented, finding that the Law Firm had provided legal serv-
ices and that the employees interviewed by the Law Firm sufficiently
represented the corporation to be deemed the corporate client for pur-
poses of application of the privilege.12 The case was then reheard en
banc. After the hearing, Judge Heaney, this time for the majority,
wrote an opinion similar to his prior dissent. The court adopted the
position that a corporation's commitment of a matter to an attorney
raises a presumption of legal services in favor of the corporation. The
court thus found that while performing the investigation and preparing
the report the Law Firm was acting in its professional capacity as a
provider of legal services.'
3
The court then turned to the question whether the corporate cli-
ent's communication was privileged, and in particular, to the question
of when an employee communication can be classified as a corporate
client's communication. Traditionally this has been decided using ei-
ther the control group test or the subject matter test. 14 Under the con-
trol group test only a corporate employee who can act on the attorney's
9. Diversified also claimed that the documents were protected under the "work product"
privilege of rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the rule, however, an
attorney's work product must be "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial." The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the documents sought by Weatherhead had not been so
prepared. Id at 604.
10. Diversified had asked the district court to certify the question of privilege as appropriate
for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). The district court refused, ordered
disclosure of the documents, and Diversified petitioned the court of appeals for relief. 572 F.2d at
598-99.
I1. 572 F.2d at 603.
12. Id at 605-06 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
13. Id at 610. While this served to protect the Law Firm's report, it did not protect the
memorandum, which was merely a preliminary document. In this respect, the en banc opinion
affirmed the earlier opinion.
14. Id at 608.
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advice may be deemed to represent the corporation. 5 Under the sub-
ject matter test only a corporate employee who communicates to the
attorney at the direction of his superior concerning the subject matter
of his employment may be identified as the corporate client.' 6 The
court of appeals concluded that the control group test "is inadequate
for determining the extent of a corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege"' 17 and proposed instead a modified subject matter test.' 8
The attorney-client privilege protects the confidentiality of com-
munications between attorney and client made for the purpose of se-
curing legal advice. The history of the privilege extends back to the
reign of Elizabeth I.19 The privilege as originally conceived belonged
to the attorney-it was a point of honor for the attorney to protect a
client's secrets.20 By the late 1700's, however, this theory had been re-
pudiated and replaced by the contemporary view that the privilege be-
longs to the client.21 As presently understood, the purpose of the rule is
to encourage clients to seek legal advice freely and to speak openly
with their attorneys by removing clients' apprehension that their com-
munications will be divulged.22
The attorney-client privilege may be invoked to protect communi-
cation between an attorney performing legal services and his client,
when the communication is intended to be confidential.2 3 A communi-
cation by an attorney to a client is protected to the same extent as a
communication by a client to an attorney, since the former may reveal
15. Id at 602 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus andprohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312
F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963)). See also note 42 and accompanying
text infra.
16. See 572 F.2d at 602 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-
92 (7th Cir. 1970), aftdmen byan equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)). See also notes 43 &
44 infra. The original subject matter test made its appearance in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), af'd mem. by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
See notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text infra.
17. 572 F.2d at 609.
18. Three judges dissented from the opinion. Judge Henley, dissenting, reasserted his con-
clusion that the Law Firm acted merely as an investigator, not as legal counsel. Id at 614 (dis-
senting opinion). Judge Gibson, also dissenting, concluded that the corporate minutes were not
protected from disclosure because they were open to the shareholders and thus their confidential-
ity had been waived. Id at 616 (dissenting opinion). Judge Bright, in a third dissenting opinion,
argued that the entire controversy was moot because Weatherhead had already uncovered the
information it sought from SEC files. Id at 617 (dissenting opinion).
19. J. WIGMORE, .supra note 1, § 2290, at 542.
20. Id at 543.
21. Id
22. Id § 2291. See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322-23
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
23. J. WmMORE, sipra note 1, § 2292.
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the substance of the latter.24 The attorney-client privilege is a personal
privilege and as such, might be thought of as being available only to
individuals, but it has been held applicable to communications to or
from a corporate client. 25 Corporations, like individuals, must be free
to communicate openly with their attorneys in order to procure needed
legal advice without fearing the repercussions of disclosure. Deciding
when the privilege may properly be invoked is, however, more difficult
in the corporate context because of the greater difficulty of determining
whether the attorney's services are actually legal services and identify-
ing who constitutes the client.26 Moreover, proper resolution of these
issues in the corporate context requires accommodating conflicting in-
terests-the need of the corporation for confidentiality on the one
hand, and on the other, the desire for disclosure on the part of the pub-
lic and of those businesses dealing with the corporation-while not ex-
tending the benefits of the attorney-client privilege beyond the interests
the privilege was designed to protect.
Because the privilege exists only when the attorney is acting in his
professional capacity as a lawyer, the first question that must be ad-
dressed in determining the scope of the privilege in an attorney-corpo-
rate client situation is what constitutes performance of legal services.27
The lawyer must be engaged in legal activities such as offering legal
advice, applying law to fact, and preparing for and carrying on litiga-
tion.28 When an attorney is performing tasks that could as easily have
been accomplished by laymen, the privilege does not apply.29 Nor does
the privilege apply when the attorney is acting, for instance, as a busi-
24. See Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
25. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
26. See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 infra.
27. See Georgia-Pacific Plywood v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(SD.N.Y. 1956).
28. There is a privilege only if... the person to whom the communication was made is
acting as a lawyer in connection with this communication .... "Acting as a lawyer"
encompasses the whole orbit of legal functions. When he acts as an adviser, the attorney
must give predominantly legal advice to retain his client's privilege of non-disclosure,
not solely, or even largely, business advice . . . . [Attorneys act as lawyers] when in
specific matters they are engaged in applying rules of law to facts known only to them-
selves and other employees of their client-companies, and in preparing cases. . . and
prosecuting appeals .... They do not "act as lawyers" when not primarily engaged in
legal activities.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
29. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C.




ness adviser.3 ° Since a corporate attorney often acts as both legal and
business adviser, the two functions must in some way be distin-
guished.31 Most courts have employed a case-by-case factual analysis
when addressing the issue of legal services. Diversfed Industries de-
parts from this practice in adopting a rule that the existence of legal
services is prima facie established by commitment of a matter to a legal
adviser. Moreover, these prior cases concerned house counsel or coun-
sel in the corporation's patent department,32 while DiversffiedIndustries
involved outside counsel. Therefore, Diversftd Industries also consti-
tutes recognition that there is potential for intermingling of legal and
business advice even when outside counsel is involved.33
A second and separate issue in applying the privilege is the deter-
mination of when. a corporate employee communication can be classi-
fied as the corporate client's communication. Corporations function
differently from individuals in several important respects. 4 While an
individual client is usually the only source of disclosure to an attorney,
the corporate client potentially has numerous spokesmen.35 An indi-
vidual client both gives information and makes decisions based on the
attorney's advice, while in a corporation these functions may be split in
such a way that some employees are information-givers and others are
decisionmakers. 36 While it is easy to determine whether a communica-
tion by an individual client is intended to be confidential, this is not the
case for the corporate client. Communications divulged to numerous
30. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963); United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751,753 (D. Del. 1943);
see Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privilege, PRAc. LAW., Nov. 1969, at 17-22.
31. "[T]he corporate lawyer is... often a business as well as legal advisor .... However,
privileged protection does not extend beyond communications necessary for legal advice and
therefore a job of line-drawing is inevitable." Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer,
56 ILL. B.J. 542, 543 (1968).
32. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546
(D.D.C. 1970) (when communications by corporation's patent attorney concern tasks which could
have been performed by nonlawyers privilege does not apply); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960) (house counsel's requests to corporate executive for
factual information on which to base legal opinion and executive's reply held privileged); Geor-
gia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Co., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (when in-
house counsel doing mostly patent work primarily communicated business advice, communica-
tions not privileged).
33. The court never stresses that it is dealing with outside rather than house counsel, and thus
the court in all likelihood intended the presumption of legal services to apply to both. However, it
is possible to argue that the presumption only applies to outside counsel since the court only
addressed that factual setting.
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corporate employees may still be intended to be confidential.17 Be-
cause of these distinct characteristics of the corporate client, the courts
have been called upon to create devices for determining when an em-
ployee speaks for the corporation and may thus be deemed to be the
corporate client. Several different approaches to this problem have
been employed.
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.38 suggested that a
communication by any officer or employee of a corporation is privi-
leged. 9 This blanket approach has not generally been accepted.40
Most courts use either the control group test or the subject matter test
to identify the corporate client. The control group test, introduced in
City ofPhilade:phia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,4 attempts to equate
the corporate client with the individual client by holding that only
those employees who help control the corporation by giving informa-
tion and participating in -decisions about future action on the basis of
the attorney's advice represent the corporation.42 In Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,43 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit found the control group test inadequate and expanded the attor-
ney-client privilege to protect some communications by corporate
employees not within the control group. The court created the subject
37. The issue of personification of the corporate client does not frequently appear in the cases
prior to 1963, the year that City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibiion denied sub nom. General Elec. Corp. v. Kirkpatrick, 312
F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963), introduced the control group test. Ap-
parently, until 1963 it was simply assumed that the attorney-client privilege applied to corporate
clients. The privilege was not explicitly held to apply to a corporation until Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
38. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), ajf'dper cur/am, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
39. Id at 359; see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 34.
40. This broad approach to the problem could conceivably conflict with the United States
Supreme Court's statement in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947), that the statements of
employees who are merely witnesses to an incident are not privileged. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 34.
41. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus andprohibition deniedsub nom. General Electric
Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
42. [I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a
position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which
the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized mem-
ber of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.
In all other cases the employee would be merely giving information to the lawyer to
enable the latter to advise those in the corporation having the authority to act or refrain
from acting on the advice.
Id at 485.
43. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), a f'dmem by an equaly divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
In Harper & Row, plaintiffs filed an antitrust suit against defendants and sought to inspect memo-
randa prepared by the defense attorneys after debriefing employees of defendant who had testified
before a federal grand jury investigating the publishing industry. Id at 489-90.
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matter test, which accords protection to a communication if it was
made by an employee at the direction of a superior and if its subject
matter was within the scope of the informant's employment.' Al-
though both these tests have been criticized,45 they are still in use. The
control group test appears to be more widely used, perhaps because it is
more easily applied and more clearly understood than the subject mat-
ter test.46
The court in Divers4'ed Industries, in addressing the two issues of
legal services and identity of the corporate client, acknowledged the
importance of determining whether the Law Firm was giving legal or
lay advice,47 and also recognized48 and attempted to deal with the criti-
cisms of the control group and subject matter tests. 49 These considera-
tions led to two new rules. The first new rule arose from an issue about
which there was much conflict within the court: whether the Law Firm
had performed legal services for Diversified. The en banc majority an-
nounced that when a person seeks an attorney it is prima facie estab-
lished that legal advice and services are being requested and given.50
When no evidence is presented to defeat this prima facie case, it will be
found that the attorney was acting in his professional capacity.5 1 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit appears to be the first court to
subscribe to this rule, first proposed by Dean Wigmore,52 although a
number of commentators had previously supported it.1
3
44. [An employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is suffi-
ciently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's
attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of
his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's
advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the perform-
ance by the employee of the duties of his employment.
Id at 491-92.
45. See note 69 infia.
46. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400
(E.D. Va. 1975).
47. 572 F.2d at 610.
48. Id at 608-09.
49. For a description of the criticisms, see note 69 infra.
50. 572 F.2d at 608-09.
51. 1d
52. It is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing legal from non-legal advice.
Where the general purpose concerns legal rights and obligations, a particular incidental
transaction would receive protection, though in itself it were merely commercial in na-
ture. ... mhe most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter commit-
ted to a professional legal adviser is prima fade so committedfor the sake of the legal
advice which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is there-
fore within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal
advice.
Id at 610 (quoting J. WIGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2296, at 566-67).
53. One commentator suggested that the corporation should have the benefit of the inference
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This prima facie approach imposes limitations on discovery by
making it more difficult for the party seeking discovery to show that the
sought-after documents are not privileged. Judge Henley, objecting to
the rule in his dissenting opinion, pointed out that the party seeking
disclosure, who must rebut the presumption, often does not know why
a particular matter was entrusted to an attorney. He further added that
often there is no way to find out.54 The majority nonetheless did imply
that the party seeking discovery is required to produce specific evidence
that the attorney was acting in a business rather than a legal capacity
when the particular communication in question was made. The better
rule, it would seem, would be to permit the party challenging the privi-
lege to make a general showing that the attorney has regularly acted as
a business adviser and not just as a legal adviser to the corporation in a
subject area that includes the communication in issue. If this showing
were made, then the burden would remain on the corporation to show
that the particular communication involved a legal matter." Under the
qualified rule, it would still be relatively easy for the corporation to
make an initial showing on the matter of legal services, but the corpo-
ration would bear a much heavier burden of persuasion when the party
seeking discovery points to regular activity by the attorney in a business
capacity. This qualification would retain the benefits of the Divers8fed
Industries prima facie rule while preventing some of its potential
inequities.
In Dipersjfed Industries, the Law Firm was engaged by the corpo-
ration to provide information about the activity of the corporation's
employees, the legal implications of that activity, and the wisest course
to take while remaining within the bounds of the law.5" Thus, even if
the party seeking discovery alleged that the Law Firm acted regularly
in a business capacity, the corporation could carry its burden of persua-
sion by showing that the Law Firm's work pertinent to this case was
essentially legal in character and, under the foregoing analysis, pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.
that an attorney is rendering legal advice when consulted by the corporation and that the party
seeking disclosure would have the burden of indicating otherwise. Simon, The Attoniey-Client
Privilege ar Applied to Corporations, 65 YA L.L 953, 977-78 (1956). A student Note also sup-
ported this approach: "Since the prevailing motive of clients in consulting attorneys is the need for
legal advice, the mere fact of legal consultation is prima facie the establishment of a professional
relationship." Note, he Law.yer- Client Privilege" Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics
and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 235, 236 (1961).
54. 572 F.2d at 613-14 (Henley, J., dissenting).
55. See Simon, supra note 53, at 977-78.
56. 572 F.2d at 610.
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The business adviser role was not presented in the facts of Diversi-
fied Industries; rather, the court was faced with the question whether an
attorney offers legal services when he acts, at least in part, as an investi-
gator.17 The court's holding that the Law Firm in its investigatory role
did offer legal services is supported by the reasoning that before an
attorney can provide legal advice he must first discover and assess the
facts surrounding a matter.5 8 Generally, a lawyer seeks factual infor-
mation in order to evaluate it and render legal advice. If courts refused
to accept this position, an attorney could only retain the privilege for
his client by explaining the legal purpose behind every step of the in-
vestigation.59 Since it is often impossible for an attorney to know
where a factual inquiry will lead until he has the facts, it is impossible
for him to indicate for what legal purpose he is seeking each piece of
information. Moreover, only the attorney has the training and skills
necessary to evaluate the information he obtains by investigation.6 °
Thus it is essential for the attorney to conduct at least parts of the in-
vestigation himself, since only he knows what each new piece of infor-
mation may portend and what pattern the investigation should follow.
The court also examined the type of advice given during the inves-
tigation to determbe whether the Law Firm as investigator was provid-
ing legal services. Judge Henley, dissenting, contended that the
recommendations of the Law Firm "could have been made by any firm
of private investigators, or by accountants, or by bankers, or, for that
matter, by any person possessing ordinary common sense and business
prudence.'61 The majority, however, found that neither accountants
nor lay investigators "would have had the training, skills and back-
ground necessary to make the independent analysis and recommenda-
tions which the Board felt essential to the future welfare of the
corporation. ' 62 The majority approach apparently recognizes that, in
57. Id at 610. The court found the Law Firm to be providing legal services notwithstanding
that the president of Diversified testified that he believed the Law Firm acted merely in an investi-
gative capacity. The court gave several reasons for this result: (1) the president, Woodlief, was not
employed until some two months after the Law Firm was retained; (2) it was impossible to deter-
mine if the president thought of attorney-client advice only in a litigation context; and (3) the
president's belief was only one factor in the court's decision, and the totality of circumstances
indicated the privilege was applicable. Id at 610 n.3.
Judge Henley argued that an attorney acting as an investigator is not offering legal services.
Id at 614 (dissenting opinion).
58. "[F]actflnding is usually the first task of the lawyer." Simon, supra note 53, at 974 n.66.
59. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
60. 572 F.2d at 610.
61. Id at 615 (Henley, J., dissenting).
62. Id at 610.
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situations involving a corporate client, 3 there is rarely a clear-cut dis-
tinction between legal and other services, and that the determination
rests on whether the attorney relied primarily on legal skills and gave
advice that was predominantly legal. While the attorney-client privi-
lege must be construed so that it does not interfere unduly with the
scope of discovery,6 the privilege must still be broad enough to accord
with the realities of corporate structure and operation. If the privilege
were to be lost because some business considerations and advice were
intermingled with primarily legal advice, the privilege would be of no
value to the corporate client. 5 Moreover, a broad definition of legal
advice does not necessarily extend the privilege, because the other re-
quirements of the privilege66 still may act to restrict its scope.
Having determined that the corporation was receiving legal serv-
ices, the court had then to decide if the communications involved were
made by persons who could properly be considered the corporate client
so that the attorney-client privilege could be applied. To aid its deci-
sionmaking, the court announced its second new rule-a new test for
determining who may personify the corporate client:
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's commu-
nication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of secur-
ing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so
at the direction of his corporate superior, (3) the superior made the
63. The considerations discussed here may apply to individual clients as well. Often an indi-
vidual receives advice from his lawyer that is not purely legal, but rather contains such an inter-
mingling of legal and nonlegal matters that it is impossible to separate the two for purposes of
applying the privilege.
64. Under federal rules, any matter that is relevant to the case is subject to discovery, unless
privileged or a part of the attorney's work product under the Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508
(1947), exception, discussed in note 40 supra. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. The modern trend has been
toward broader discovery because of the desirability of obtaining all the relevant facts. 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 34.
65. The privilege may, under these circumstances, lack viability for the individual client as
well. See discussion in note 63 supra. The court recognized that such a narrow view might have
severe repercussions for the existence of the privilege, as did Judge Wyzanski in United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), when he addressed the problem of
outside counsel and stated:
They were not acting as business advisors or officers ... even though occasionaly their
recommendations had in addition to legal points some economic or policy or public
relations aspect and hence were not unmixed opinions of law. The modern lawyer al-
most invariably advises his client upon not only what is permissible but also what is
desirable. And it is in the public interest that the lawyer should regard himself as more
than a predictor of legal consequences. His duty to society as well as to his client in-
volves many relevant social, economic, political and philosophical considerations. And
the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations
are expressly stated in a communication which also includes legal advice.
Id at 359 (emphasis added).
66. Note 1 supra.
A TTORAEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the sub-
ject matter of the communication is within the scope of the em-
ployee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents. We note. . . that the corpora-
tion has the burden of showing that the communication in issue
meets all of the above requirements.67
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is apparently the first court
to employ this test,6" which is a modified subject matter test that strikes
a balance between the much-criticized control group and subject matter
tests.69 This new test expands the amount of information that a corpo-
ration can communicate to its attorney with the assurance that it will be
protected, while it avoids the potential abuse of protecting all corporate
employee communications from discovery.70
Under the court's analysis, following the preliminary determina-
tion that the attormey functions as provider of legal services, the focus
shifts to the reason for which the client seeks the attorney's assistance.
The requirements that the communication be made for the purpose of
securing legal advice, and that a superior request an employee to com-
municate so that the corporation can secure legal advice, assure that the
corporation is barred from claiming a privilege it did not intend to cre-
ate at the outset. These requirements also prevent the corporation from
sending routine reports and memoranda to its attorney and then claim-
ing they are privileged.7 1 With these requirements the test focuses not
67. 572 F.2d at 609.
68. The test announced by the court was borrowed from Judge Weinstein. 2 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 34.
69. The control group test has been criticized as defeating the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege because it would deny the privilege to the communications of most corporate employees,
and thereby inhibit disclosure to the attorney. See Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on
the "Control Group" Teit in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRAcusE L. REv. 759, 767 (1971). The con-
trol group test may thus unreasonably narrow the corporate client's ability to communicate fully
with the attorney. Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 873, 875 (1971). On the other hand, the subject matter test has been
criticized because it could protect. every employee's communication and thus make discovery im-
possible. Note, supra, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group
Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424, 432 (1970). Originally, the Supreme Court's proposed rule of evi-
dence 503 on the attorney-client privilege defined a representative of the client in terms of the
control group test. However, because no agreement could be reached on the matter of which test
to use, the definition was simply left out of the final draft of proposed rule 503. 2 J. WEINSTE N &
M. BERGER, supra note 34, 503 [01]. In the end, Congress substituted a single rule on privilege
for the 13 separate ruler drafted by the Supreme Court. This single rule is FED. R. EviD. 501.
70. Thus it remains compatible with the Supreme Court's statement in Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947), discussed in note 40 supra.
71. 572 F.2d at 609.
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on who is communicating with an attorney but why.72
The requirement that the employee make the communication at
the direction of his superior is taken directly from the subject matter
test73 and focuses on who is communicating with the attorney. This
requirement is another means for ensuring that the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship was intended at the outset. The underlying
consideration of this particular aspect of the subject matter and modi-
fied subject matter tests seems to be that the employee must somehow
represent the corporation, a consideration that was the main focus of
the control group test. The requirement as it is presented here, how-
ever, is freed from the overly restrictive approach of that test. Under
this requirement, the employees may become an extension of the con-
trol group when they are directed to communicate by their superiors.
When there is such control of the employees' communications by
superiors who are involved with the attorney, the employees may be
deemed to personify the corporation in making these communications.
The goal is to assure that the communications for which protection is
sought were intended to be made by the corporation in the context of
an attorney-client relationship and were not the unauthorized com-
ments of an employee who casually gave the attorney information.
The requirement that the subject matter of the communication be
within the scope of the employee's duties is the other element of the
original subject matter test that is carried over into the new test. This
requirement denies the privilege to the communications of an employee
who was merely a witness to an event.7 4 In situations in which the
employee is performing his corporate duties, he can be deemed to act
for or personify the corporation. When he is merely a witness, this is
not a valid assumption. Moreover, this requirement ensures that only
work expressly done on behalf of the corporation and which is thus
entitled to be kept a corporate confidence will be privileged.
The last requirement demands that a communication not be dis-
seminated beyond those with a need to know its contents. This require-
ment aims at protecting only those communications intended to be
confidential, a traditional prerequisite for the assertion of the privi-
lege.75 This test recognizes that, because of the structure of a corpora-
72. See Kobak, The Uneven Application of thelttorney- Client Privilege to Corporations in the
Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339, 341, 371 (1972).
73. See note 44 supra.
74. See note 40 supra.
75. In order for a communication to be protected it must be a confidential communication.
"The requirement that the communication be made 'without the presence of strangers' means that
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tion, and in order for the corporation to function, there must be some
dissemination of information beyond the employee who makes the
communication and the attorney who receives it.76 On the other hand,
indiscriminate dissemination of information within the corporation
tends to indicate that such information was not intended to be confi-
dential, and the corporation cannot assert confidentiality at a later date
simply because changed circumstances make it desirable to claim the
privilege. This requirement strives to achieve an appropriate balance
and permits communications to be disseminated within the corporation
to a limited extent and still be deemed confidential.77
When applying the attorney-client privilege to corporations, the
ultimate goal is to achieve a balance that fosters the purposes of the
privilege while protecting the scope of discovery. The court must deal
with the complexities of the corporate structure and be aware of the
characteristics that distinguish a corporate from an individual client.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in its examination of the
questions of performance of legal services and of personification of the
corporation, has adopted rules that advance the pursuit of the goal.
The rule that matters committed to a lawyer are prima facie so commit-
ted in order to obtain legal services brings some order into a confusing
area. By using this approach, courts need no longer depend on an en-
tirely case-by-case approach. The prima facie rule will make decisions
in this area more uniform, and will alleviate some of the enormous
confusion that results from attempts to distinguish between legal and
nonlegal advice. This rule would, however, be improved if qualified to
permit the party seeking discovery to defeat the prima facie case by
the communication must have been intended as confidential, i.e., not intended to be related to
others.' IBM Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D. Del. 1968).
76. See general, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested
Approach, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 360, 377-78 (1970).
[I]n order to foster the policy of encouraging full and accurate disclosure by clients
• . . communications within the corporation that are necessary for completeness and
accuracy of information given the attorney should be considered confidential even
though they have been communicated to third persons .... Thus, in order properly to
perform his function, the attorney must be able to reveal fully to decision makers the
substance of what he has learned from corporate employees and the ramifications
thereof without fearing that he would thereby remove the privilege from information
that would otherwise be protected.
id at 378.
77. The court in DiversfedIndustries found that Weinstein's requirements had been satisfied
in the case of the report prepared by the Law Firm. The communications were made and directed
by the Board of Directors to be made for the purpose of securing legal advice, the interviews only
covered matters within the employees' corporate duties, and the corporation avoided disseminat-
ing the information to anyone other than those directly concerned with the investigation.
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showing that an attorney has regularly acted in another capacity for a
corporation. Finally, even though the modified subject matter test will
probably have its critics, this new test appears to effect a balance be-
tween the narrowness of the control group test and the expansiveness of
the traditional subject matter test on the issue of personification of the
corporation. In a confused field the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has provided much needed clarity.
SHERI A. VAN GREENBY
Constitutional Law-Administrative Searches-Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc.: OSHA Needs a Warrant
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) inspectors have since
OSHA's passage seven years ago' entered and inspected the business
premises of thousands of employers to ascertain compliance with the
myriad of job safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.2
A great number of these inspections have been made pursuant to sec-
tion 8(a)3 of OSHA, which apparently authorized warrantless inspec-
1. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970), was
signed into law on December 29, 1970, and became effective April 28, 1971. Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 34, 84 Stat. 1590.
2. The stated congressional purpose behind OSHA was
[11o assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources-
3) by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and
health standards applicable to business affecting interstate commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). The Secretary has used this authority to promulgate over 4,400 safety
standards. Brief for Appellee at 39, Marshall v. Barlow, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978) (citing R.
SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT. ITS GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 11
(1976)). Because the Act makes these standards applicable to business affecting interstate com-
merce, over four million business establishments are covered. Comment, OSHA: Employer
Beware, 10 Hous. L. REv. 426, 429 (1973).
3. Section 8(a) of OSHA provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized
1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by
an employee of an employer, and
2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of em-
ployment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equip-
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